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This paper studies attitudes about who should provide for the livelihood of the elderly in two 
aging societies, namely Germany and Japan. Applying an ordered logit model to individual 
data from representative public opinion surveys, it is analysed which socio-demographic, 
economic or political variables help to explain people’s attitudes on whether the government 
or individuals should be responsible for the livelihood of the elderly. We find that while 
higher income makes people more inclined towards the individual option, age is found to do 
the opposite in both countries. We conjecture that this age effect is related to the level of 
knowledge about the current situation of the public pension system. We also find that the part-
time work status significantly affects attitudes in both countries, but not the same way. It 
affects adversely the inclination towards a government-based pension system in the case of 
Japan but positively in Germany. Other significant influences are the pensioner status of the 
respondents in Japan and their political position in the case of German data.  
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One of the urgent structural problems that Germany and Japan have in common is reforming 
their social security systems. Both countries are experiencing a rapid aging of the society, 
which threatens to eventually make their social insurance systems unsustainable. However, 
similar to the situation in other countries, structural reforms are politically sensitive. One 
important aspect is that politicians in particular appear to be quite reluctant to address these 
problems using appropriate approaches. This is arguably the case because those who are 
adversely affected in the reforms are perceived to be better organized politically than those 
who are not. Since politicians tend to be short-term oriented in democracies and pension 
reform is a long-term issue, necessary adjustments are sluggish. Usually social security 
“reforms” are implemented that alleviate short-term financial pressures but do not prevent 
another crisis a few years later.  
For an analysis of this situation from a political economy perspective it is useful to identify 
who would be for or against such policies objectively, as well as who would be affected how 
subjectively. In social security reforms, there is a large volume of economic research on the 
first theme. We would argue that this is not sufficient because in a situation of limited 
information and bounded rationality people may not recognize and accept such “objective” 
benefits, and oppose even those policies that benefit them due to misperceptions. Research on 
the second theme would be significant in that it, first, identifies where such a “perception gap” 
exists and, second, which segments of the society the policymakers should target when 
formulating the reform strategies. If politicians can be more certain that they will not be 
punished in the next election for having introduced changes in the social security system they 
are more likely to behave in a socially optimal way.  
The aim of this paper is to compare the subjective attitudes towards the livelihood of the 
elderly in Germany and Japan. It is studied which individual characteristics explain these 
attitudes, using representative public opinion data that only recently were made available to a 
wider group of researchers. Although the livelihood of the elderly relates to various 
institutions of social security, we think that the pension system is the most relevant, and thus 
forms the basis of our discussion. Contrasting the actual empirical results with a priori 
hypotheses based on a general notion of individual intertemporal utility maximisation yields 
interesting insights about which groups in these societies perceive to be better off under a 
pension system dominated by government or individuals, respectively.  
Many issues that are of relevance to the topic of pension reform, in particular related to the 
welfare state, have been discussed in very different contexts; for example, re-distributional  
 
aspects are studied by Corneo and Grüner (2002), intergenerational conflicts by Hamil-Luker 
(2001), and differing preferences of populations in Europe and the US by Alesina et al. (2004). 
However, there are relatively few studies on the specific question of public attitudes towards 
organising the pension system, most of which are quite recent. Boeri et al. (2001, 2002) look 
at attitudes towards pension reform in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Evans and Kelly 
(2004) investigate public opinion on this issue in Australia and compare results with samples 
from Finland and Poland. For the Netherlands, van Els (2003) et al. provide empirical 
evidence. Using data from the International Social Survey Programs (ISSP), Role of 
Government III, Kikuzawa (2005) compares attitudes on questions related to the government 
responsibility for providing for the livelihood of the elderly for various countries, including 
Germany and Japan. She finds a somewhat higher support in Germany than in Japan with 
regard to a stronger individual responsibility for the livelihood of the elderly.  
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the pension systems in the two countries. 
The third section discusses the data base and some methodological issues. Various hypotheses 
that are put to the test are presented in the fourth section. Sections five and six report the 
estimation results and the interpretations thereof. The final, seventh section summarises and 
concludes the paper.   
 
 
2. Institutional Overview 
Since we give a particular focus on the pension system in considering the livelihood of the 
elderly, a brief overlook of the public system in Germany and Japan is in order. 
The German pension system is based on three pillars. The statutory public pension system is 
by far the most important pillar by providing on average more than three quarters of old age 
incomes (see Figure 1). The other two pillars are company-based pension systems and 
individual pension plans. Most employees have to pay a certain percentage of their wage into 
the public pension system, while most professionals, independent businessmen, and firm-
owners can choose to opt out. Civil servants receive their pensions out of the general budget 
of the authorities (federal level or state level) they are working for. The public pension pillar 
is primarily a pay-as-you-go system, i.e. the current working population pays for the current 
generation of retirees. The actual size of the individual pension is computed using a relatively 
complicated formula based, among other things, upon the number of years of a person’s 




Figure 1: Overview of the German pension system 
Source: German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 6 % of incomes come from sources other than 
the three pillars.  
 
In general, pensions grow in line with average wages in the economy. Any gap between 
pension contributions and obligations is being covered by the general federal budget. To 
strengthen the funded part of the German pension system, the government subsidises certain 
company-based and individual-based pension plans since 2002. 
 
In the case of the Japanese public pension system, there are, at least, three important 
characteristics worth mentioning. The most salient one is its so-called two-storied system (see 
Figure 2). Everyone belongs to the common “first floor” or the Basic Pension, which provides 
them with the same level of entitlements, regardless of the premium they have paid up to the 
starting age. The “second floor” differs from person to person, based on their job categories. 
For instance, salaried workers of private sectors and government employees (collectively, 
category-II insured) belong to, respectively, their employees’ pension insurance and mutual 
aid associations, which entitle them with the benefits based on their income before the 
retirement. These two are compulsory. However, self-employed and non-working spouses of 
the category-II insured (category-I insured and category-III insured, respectively) do not have 
such “second-floor” coverage as compulsory, and can choose to join the National Pension 
Fund if so desired. The second characteristic of the Japanese public pension is that, although it 
is run as a funded system in principle, it is de facto a pay-as-you-go system. In 2003, the 
system ran a deficit, with revenues of 3,614 billion yen and expenditures of 3,664 billion yen 
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though it was designed as an insurance institution, it is partially financed by tax. More 
specifically, one third of the revenue for the Basic Pension is tax. So, there are many 
ambivalences in the system.  
 
Figure 2: Overview of the Japanese pension system 
 
Source: Social Insurance Agency Homepage 
 
Comparing Germany and Japan with respect to pension coverage, note that in the former 
country there is no basic pension that encompasses all retirees. Instead retirees that would fall 
below a generally defined minimum standard of living (Existenzminimum) receive, out of the 
local public welfare funds, an allowance and possibly in-kind transfers from the government 
to ensure their livelihood, such as housing, health care, and subsidies for durable consumer 
goods. As a study by the Cabinet Office of Japan (2002) shows, these design differences 
translate themselves into a relatively lower average share of retirees that receive a public 
pension under the German system.   
 
 
3. Data base and methodology 
The data base in the case of Japan is the Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), which is the 
first of its kind in this country and draws many questions from the US General Social 
Survey.
1 It is a nationwide representative survey collected using a two-stage stratified random 
                                                 
1 The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are designed and carried out at the Institute of Regional Studies at 
Osaka University of Commerce in collaboration with the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo 
under the direction of Ichiro TANIOKA, Michio NITTA, Hiroki SATO and Noriko IWAI with Project Manager, 
Minae OSAWA. The project is financially assisted by Gakujutsu Frontier Grant from the Japanese Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology for 1999-2003 academic years, and the datasets are 
compiled with cooperation from the SSJ Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, 
Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo.  
 
sampling process, with stratification based on population (20 - 89 years), region and by 
population of size of cities/districts. In the present study we use JGSS 2003, which was 
sampled in November 2003.
2  
In the following, our dependent variable for Japan is based on the question:  
 
“Who do you think should be responsible for the livelihood of the elderly?  
Answer categories: 1. Individuals and families  Å  2,  3,  4  Æ  5. Government 
 
For Germany, we employ survey data from the project “Deutschland vor der 
demographischen Herausforderung” (Germany facing the demographic challenge) initiated by 
the Bundesverband deutscher Banken (Association of German Banks) and conducted by IPOS 
Mannheim. The data were collected by telephone interviews over the time period 23 August 
to 2 September 2004 and are representative for the population from 18 years onwards.
3 The 
dependent variable in this case is: 
 
“In your opinion, who should be responsible for the provision of old age? 
Answer categories: 1. Primarily individuals, 2. both to the same extent, 3. Government 
 
Note that for the dependent variables in both countries, Germany and Japan, answers are 
coded in such a way that higher numbers indicate greater support for a government 
responsibility for the livelihood of elderly. Table 1 presents a summary of the respective 
frequencies for the answer categories.  
 
Table 1: Answer frequencies of responsibility for livelihood of the elderly 
 Individuals    ↔  ↔ both ↔  ↔   Government 
Japan  7%  11% 31% 26% 25% 
Germany  17% n.a. 71% n.a. 12% 
Note: No of observations: Japan: 1940, Germany: 1509.  
 
These figures indicate that in Germany a majority of people opt for a mixed system to finance 
the livelihood of the elderly, with 5 percent preferring individual responsibility over social 
responsibility. Given that the scale is different, the comparison depends on how we allocate 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of this survey see Iwai (2004). Our version of the data set was obtained from the 
Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of Cologne (Study no. ZA4200). 
3 The data are available from the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of Cologne 
(Study no. ZA4058).   
 
the share of the two additional categories in the Japanese data. If we assume that respondents 
would have opted for the middle category given a three-point scale, the Japanese would also 
prefer a mixed system. In contrast to the Germans, they would be relatively more in favour of 
government provision with an 18 percent lead. However, if we allocate the two additional 
middle categories in Japan to the extremes, we even find a majority of Japanese supporting a 
government-based provision of old age. Independent from any issues arising from the 
allocation of the answers to these additional categories, the Japanese are less favourable with 
regard to leaving the livelihood of their elderly in the hands of individuals than the Germans 
are. This is consistent with the results reported by Kikuzawa (2005), using a different data set.  
In the actual empirical analyses in Section 4, we want to investigate whether attitudes to this 
question can be explained using socio-demographic, economic, and political variables. Table 
2 summarises information on the variables used in this analysis for both Germany and Japan.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for data used in ordered logit model 
 Germany  Japan 
Variables  Mean  St. Dev.  Correlation Mean  St. Dev.  Correlation
Government provision 
for old age  1.94 0.53 
 
1  3.51 1.19 
 
1 
Age  effect:           
 Age  45.35  15.45  -0.003  53.28  15.54  -0.11 
  Age  squared  2295  1508 0.002 3075  1627  -0.11 
Gender  effect:           
  Female  0.51  0.50 0.07 0.52  0.50  0.03 
Marital  status:           
 Single  0.30  0.46  -0.01  0.10  0.31  0.03 
 Married  0.53  0.50  -0.007  0.79  0.41  -0.04 
  Separated/widowed  0.17  0.37 0.02 0.11  0.31  0.02 
No of children  0.66  0.48  0.04  1.81  1.13  -0.08 
Education:           
  Primary  school  0.29  0.45 0.06 0.04  0.19  0.02 
 Secondary  school  0.34  0.47  -0.02  0.24  0.43  -0.02 
 A-level/High  school  0.16  0.36  -0.01  0.44  0.50  0.01 
 College/University  0.22  0.41  -0.04  0.29  0.45  0.001 
Employment  status            
 
 Full-time  employee  0.50  0.50  -0.10  0.43  0.50  0.01 
  Part-time  employee  0.12  0.33 0.08 0.18  0.39 -0.06 
  Retirees  0.17  0.37 0.03 0.11  0.31  0.03 
  Unemployed  0.05  0.21 0.07 0.02  0.14  0.04 
  Household  0.06  0.24 0.07 0.23  0.42  -0.003 
 In  education  0.06  0.24  -0.004  0.003  0.06  0.02 
 Other  0.02  0.12  -0.03       
Absolute income  0.02  0.99  -0.14  5.659  3.771  -0.07 
Income  quartiles           
  Lowest  quartile  0.24  0.43 0.09 0.22  0.41  0.05 
  Lower-middle  quartile  0.26  0.44 0.08 0.24  0.43  0.02 
 Upper-middle  quartile  0.25  0.43  -0.06  0.26  0.44  -0.02 
 Highest  quartile  0.26  0.44  -0.11  0.28  0.45  -0.05 
Political  orientation           
 CDU/CSU  0.38  0.49  -0.07  n.a. 
 SPD  0.21  0.41  0.02  n.a. 
 Green  Party  0.11  0.31  -0.06  n.a. 
 PDS  0.07  0.25  0.15  n.a. 
 Other  parties  0.05  0.22  -0.01  n.a. 
 No  voting  0.19  0.39  0.02  n.a. 
 Left-right  placement  n.a.  2.91  0.92  0.06 
Community size:              
  Village/town  0.30  0.46 0.0003 0.23 0.42  -0.04 
  Cities  0.44  0.50 0.02 0.58  0.49  0.01 
 Largest  cities  0.26  0.44  -0.02  0.19  0.39  0.03 
Notes:  
Japan: No of observations: 1245. Absolute income in Million Yen based on 19 intervals. Education categories 
are based on the following years of schooling: Primary: 6, Secondary: 9, High school: 12, College/University: 
16+.  
Germany: no of observations: 1155. Absolute income is based on factor scores and varies between -3.6 and 1.7. 
Education categories are based on the following years of schooling: Primary: 9, Secondary: 10, High school: 
12/13, College/University: 16+. Town/village is coded between 0 and 5000 inhabitants, other cities between 
10000 and 100000, and big cities greater than 100000.  
 
The choice of variables is based on theoretical considerations outlined in the next section and, 
of course, subject to constraints coming from the data base. For each country, the table  
 
provides mean values, standard deviations and the correlations with the dependent variable 
measuring attitudes towards responsibility for livelihood of the elderly. Except for the 
dependent variable, age, absolute income and number of children all variables are coded as 
dummies. This allows the interpretation of the mean as a share of a particular category in the 
sample, e.g. the share of female respondents is 51% in Germany and 52% in Japan.  
The German survey does not include a direct question on income. To overcome this limitation, 
we compute an indicator for income based on the score values generated by a factor analysis 
using 10 variables that tend to be associated with income. In particular, the factor analysis 
includes information on (factor loadings in brackets): whether the household saves money 
(0.52), receives a pension (-0.58), is still in education (0.56), is fully employed (0.64), is 
unemployed (-0.28), is widowed (-0.47), rates his economic situation as bad (-0.46), is happy 
(0.38), is a blue-collar worker (-0.34), and is a white-collar worker (0.30). The Eigenvector 
takes on a value of 2.2 and it explains 22% of the common variance. While the explained 
variance is not particularly high, all of the variables exhibit the theoretically expected signs, 
which we interpret as indicating the reliability of our indicator.
4  
In Table 2, concentrating on correlations larger than 10% between the dependent and the other 
variables indicates that in the case of Germany full-time employees, absolutely and relatively 
richer respondents are more in favour of individual responsibility of providing for the elderly, 
while supporters of the left-wing party PDS tend to support government responsibility. In the 
case of Japan, the only correlation larger than 10% is related to older people expressing a 
preference for individual responsibility.  
However, these bivariate correlations do not take into account possible interactions between 
the various explanatory variables, which we will address in the multivariate analysis below. 
Since the dependent variable is of an ordered scale, it would be inappropriate to apply 
ordinary least squares estimators. Instead, we use ordered logit models (see Green 1991). The 
full model contains all common explanatory variables in the surveys on both countries. 
Following the general-to-specific modelling strategy advocated by Hendry (1993), a 
consistent testing-down process has been applied to this model. We employ normal standard 
errors (SE) in the analysis but it can be shown that using heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors based on White (1980) does not lead to noticeable differences. In the interpretation of 
the variables, we generally concentrate on the statistically significant effects of the variables 
that remain after the testing-down process.  
                                                 
4 We have also constructed an alternative indicator using 5 variables only (factor loadings in brackets): whether 
the household saves money (0.43), receives a pension (-0.79), is still in education (0.49), is fully employed 
(0.71), is widowed (-0.64). The Eigenvector takes on a value of 1.96 and it explains 39% of the common 




4. Theoretical hypotheses 
In the following, we discuss a variety of theoretical relationships between individual 
characteristics and attitudes towards responsibility for the livelihood of the elderly. We 
concentrate on those effects that we can operationalise empirically given our data base. 
Moreover, the focus is on relationships on a ceteris paribus basis, at least for those effects we 
can control for, using one or more of the other covariates.   
Age: We would conjecture that age will be one of the most important variables affecting 
attitudes, as these attitudes are likely going to change over the life-cycle. Assuming non-fully 
rational agents or hyperbolic discounting, in an early age, very few would ever think of their 
livelihood when old. Over time, after moving through childhood and adolescence into 
adulthood, more certain attitude about who should support them after retirement will be 
formed. In particular, entering the labour market, and thereby paying taxes and social 
insurance premia, will make people more aware of this issue. Whether this has a noteworthy 
impact on the attitude towards our question of interest is not clear. Our preliminary hypothesis 
based on assuming rational actors is that the older the people get, the more inclined they 
become towards the public support option. One reason is that they have already paid a large 
amount of contributions to the public system and would want to “collect them back” in the 
form of the benefits. A related reason is that, once they started to be supported by the public 
system, it would be almost impossible to switch to an individual- or family-based system as 
an alternative for the government-based system even if it is cut back.  
Gender: Men and women may develop different attitudes and opinions towards the 
livelihood of their old age. Before becoming of old age, men work, earn, and possibly save 
more for their old age than females. On the other hand, women spend more time with their 
children, if any, and develop greater bonds with them. They also tend to be more integrated 
into social networks. Thus, a male-female difference would depend on one of these motives 
being stronger than the other.  
Marital status: If people choose not to get married, they cannot rely on family support 
when old. They can only resort to their private funds or depend upon the public system. Thus, 
from this insurance point of view, our hypothesis is that married persons will be relatively 
more in favour of individual-based systems than singles.  
Number of children: If people have offspring, they can rely on them for old-age support, 
at least in principle. The more children they have, the greater the insurance effect resulting 
from more choices in the means of sustaining their old age life. Thus, our hypothesis is that  
 
they rather oppose the public support option of paying higher contributions and receiving 
higher benefits. 
Education:  More educated people know better where and how their taxes and 
contributions are used than those who are not. Because of that, they tend to view the public 
system more critically. More educated persons may be more likely to think about their life 
from an intertemporal perspective and more aware of the economic life-cycle, while less 
educated people may naively expect more support from a public system. Therefore, our 
hypothesis is that educated people will prefer a more individualistic system.  
Employment status: Employment directly affects a person’s financial security. If people 
do not have jobs and thus no market income, they have less means to support their life now 
and in the old age. Germany has a particular problem with long-term unemployment, which 
implies that having no job this year raises the likelihood of being unemployed next year. 
Japan has seen a tremendous increase in non-regular workers (including part-time workers) 
that are estimated to make up about 30% of total workers in 2004 and who do not have 
automatic access to old-age pensions. Therefore, it is natural to assume that on average the 
unemployed tend to rely more on the public sector – today and in the future. To the extent that 
part-time jobs are characterised by a lesser degree of job stability than full-time jobs, a similar 
attitude may develop. Full-time employees tend to have greater financial security than part-
time workers and those out of employment. It is especially true in Japan, because the well-
known “life-long employment” of salaried workers in large businesses is still a widely 
practiced norm. Thus, our hypotheses are that the unemployed will be most strongly in favour 
of government responsibility, followed by part-time workers. Contrary to that, we expect full-
time workers to be rather in favour of individual-based responsibilities of old age support.  
Absolute and relative income:  The more income people earn, the more financially 
independent and secure they become. Arguably, greater financial independence and security 
would make people lean towards the individual option, because they have fewer choices in 
and control over the public support system than the individual/private ones they may choose 
in the financial markets. In other words, the compulsory public system would lower their 
personal welfare. A related argument can be made with respect to relative income. Being 
relatively more affluent does not generate more choices in the same way that absolute income 
does. However, we know from the socio-economic literature on life-satisfaction that people 
often think in terms of relative quantities instead of absolute ones (see, e.g. Frey and Stutzer 
2002). In the current context, absolute and relative incomes are likely going to have a very 
similar impact on the attitudes towards the pension system. Thus, we put forward the  
 
hypothesis that absolutely and/or relatively richer people will show more support for an 
individual-based systems.  
Political orientation: We would expect that a person’s general political beliefs will affect 
his attitude towards old age support. The political position may of course also be influenced 
by the socio-demographic and economic factors potentially affecting attitude towards the 
livelihood of the elderly. However, in other studies on economic reform issues, it was found 
that political believes may constitute a separate influence from, say, the current economic 
situation (Hayo, 2005). Our hypothesis is that the more people support left-wing political 
positions, the more inclined they will be towards implementing more government 
responsibility in the organisation of the social security system.  
Community size: People’s opinions about the public or individual responsibilities with 
respect to the livelihood of the elderly may depend on whether they live in more urban or 
rural areas. Those persons living in rural areas tend to have more traditional views and values 
related to the family. In particular, the family and personal relationships play a larger role, 
which leads us to the hypothesis that those living in the urban areas will be relatively more in 
favour of individual responsibility than urban dwellers.  
 
 
5. Empirical estimates for Germany and Japan 
After developing our theoretical hypotheses in the previous section, we will now test them for 
each country with the help of ordered logit models, the results of which can be found in Table 
3.  
 
Table 3: Full Models: Explaining responsibility for livelihood for the elderly 
 Germany  Japan 
Variables Coefficients  St.  Dev. Coefficients St.  Dev. 
Age  effect:      
  Age  -0.037 0.035 0.039 0.025 
 Age  squared  0.0002  0.0004  -0.001*  .0003 
Gender  effect:      
 Female  0.168  0.152  -0.007  0.133  
 
 
Marital  status:      
 Married  Reference 
 Single  0.063  0.224  -0.314  0.220 
  Separated/widowed  -0.044 0.208 -0.212 0.151 
No of children  0.103  0.205  -0.077  0.055 
Education:      
 Primary  school  Reference 
  Secondary  school -0.165 0.195 -0.495 0.313 
 A-level/High  school  -0.010  0.256  -0.688*  0.337 
 College/University  0.108  0.254  -0.828*  0.349 
Employment  status      
 Full-time  employee  Reference 
 Part-time  employee  0.483(*)  0.255  -0.212  0.151 
  Retirees  0.008  0.323 0.531* 0.212 
  Household  0.452 0.337 0.065 0.172 
  Unemployed  -0.002 0.385 0.430 0.413 
  In  education  -0.495 0.381 0.394 0.788 
  Other  -0.874 0.566 0.334 0.374 
Absolute  income  -0.237 0.223 -0.014 0.029 
Income  quartiles      
 Lowest  quartile  Reference 
 Lower-middle  quartile  0.024  0.303  -0.156  0.177 
 Upper-middle  quartile  -0.383  0.413  -0.410(*)  0.217 
  Highest  quartile  -0.449 0.529 -0.452 0.305 
Political  orientation      
 CDU/CSU  Reference 
 SPD  0.278  0.184  n.a. 
 Green  Party  -0.188  0.231  n.a. 
 PDS  1.52**  0.294  n.a. 
 Other  parties  -0.074  0.316  n.a. 
 No  voting  0.077  0.198  n.a. 
 Left-right  placement  n.a.  -0.452  0.305  
 
 
Community  size:       
 Town/village  Reference 
  Cities  0.125 0.164 0.109 0.132 
  Largest  cities  -0.055 0.210 0.216 0.171 
Regional dummies  15 regional dummies included  5 regional dummies included 
Cut  values      
  Cut value 1  -2.692  0.926  -3.415  0.694 
  Cut value 2  1.292  0.923  -2.234  0.689 
  Cut value 3  -0.797  0.687 
  Cut value 4 
n.a. 
n.a. 0.401  0.686 
No of observations  1155  1245 
Log likelihood  -852.6  -1831.1 
LR Test  Chi
2(41) = 95.7**  Chi
2(27) = 66.7** 
Pseudo-R
2 0.05  0.02 
Notes: (*), *, ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Regional dummies: Germany 
(reference category: Nordrhein-Westfalen): Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Bremen, Hessen, 
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen, and Sachsen. Japan (reference category: Kanto): Hokkaido, Chubu, Kinki, Cyugoku, 
and Kyusyu. For other information see notes to Table 2. 
 
The pseudo-R
2 values of the different models vary between 2% and 5%, which is quite small 
in absolute terms. The regression on Japan in particular indicates little explanatory power. 
However, the fit of the regressions is not necessarily worse than in other comparable areas of 
microeconometrics, e.g. in the analyses of labour markets or life satisfaction.  
 
Applying the testing down procedure on the full models yields the reduced models displayed 
in Table 4. There is strong collinearity between age and its squared value as well as between 
the indicators for absolute income and income quartiles. Drawing on Occam’s razor, we keep 
the linear relationship between age and the dependent variable and eliminate the non-linear 
term. The test statistics in the removal test is slightly more favourable when keeping the 
income quartiles and thus we delete absolute income. Thus, while the removal decisions 
affecting these variables are somewhat arbitrary the specific choice of the surviving variables 




Table 4: Reduced Models: Explaining responsibility for livelihood for the elderly 
 Germany  Japan 
Variables Coefficients  St.  Dev. Coefficients St.  Dev. 
Age  effect:      
 Age  -0.010*  0.005  -0.019**  0.004 
Employment  status      
 Full-time  employee  Reference 
 Part-time  employee  0.553**  0.205  -0.219(*)  0.127 
 Retirees      0.376(*)  0.207 
Income  quartiles      
 Lowest  quartile  Reference 
 Upper-middle  quartile  -0.708**  0.170  -0.325*  0.136 
  Highest  quartile  -0.823** 0.170 -0.392** 0.121 
Political  orientation      
 CDU/CSU  Reference 
 PDS  1.45**  0.257  n.a. 
Regional dummies  Removed  Removed 
Cut  values      
  Cut value 1  -2.356**  0.263  -3.855**  0.253 
  Cut value 2  1.531**  0.251  -2.690**  0.242 
  Cut value 3  -1.280**  0.231 
  Cut value 4 
n.a. 
n.a. -0.099  0.227 
No of observations  1155  1245 
Log likelihood  -867.7  -1847.0 
LR Test  Chi
2(5) = 65.7**  Chi
2(5) = 34.9** 
Pseudo-R
2 0.04  0.01 
Testing down restriction  Chi
2(36) = 29.7  Chi
2(22) = 27.8 
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. 
 
The coefficients of ordered logit models can be misleading with regard to the effects of 
changes in the explanatory variables on the predicted probabilities of falling under one of the 
categories of the dependent variable (Greene 1991, 703ff). In particular, the estimated 
coefficients do not imply sign restrictions on the effects of changes in the explanatory 
variables on the middle categories. It is therefore useful to compute marginal effects of 
explanatory variables, here evaluated at the sample mean of the other variables. For dummy  
 
variables, this is not truly a marginal effect but rather the change from zero to one. In Table 5, 
we give marginal effects for the reduced models in Table 3.  
 
Table 5: Reduced model: Marginal effects of ordered logit regressions from Table 4 
 Individuals  ↔  ↔ both ↔ ↔ Government 
Germany         
Age 0.0014*  n.a.  -0.0005*  n.a.  -0.0009* 
Employment status:  
Part-time employee  
-0.064** n.a.  0.006  n.a.  0.058* 
Income quartile: 
Upper-middle  
0.107** n.a.  -0.052** n.a.  -0.055** 
Income quartile:  
Highest 
0.125** n.a.  -0.063** n.a.  -0.063** 
Political orientation:  
PDS  
-0.126** n.a. -0.081*  n.a.  0.206** 
Frequency in %  
(actual / predicted) 
0.17 / 0.16  n.a.  0.72 / 0.74 n.a.  0.11 / 0.10 
         
Japan         
Age 0.001**  0.002**  0.002**  -0.001**  -0.004** 
Employment status:  
Part-time employee  
0.014 0.020  0.020(*)  -0.015  -0.040(*) 
Employment status:  
Retiree 
-0.020* -0.031*  -0.041(*)  0.017**  0.075(*) 
Income quartile: 
Upper-middle  
0.021* 0.030*  0.030**  -0.023*  -0.058* 
Income quartile:  
Highest 
0.026** 0.036**  0.036** -0.028**  -0.070** 
Frequency in %  
(actual / predicted) 
0.07 / 0.07  0.12 / 0.12  0.29 / 0.30 0.27 / 0.27  0.25 / 0.25 
Notes: See notes to Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
 
To ensure that the test results are not biased due to heteroscedasticity, we also compute robust 
standard errors based on White (1980). It turns out that all of the conclusions hold up.   
 
In the case of Japan, the use of the income variables leads to a loss of over 500 observations 
due to missing data. While the sample size is still large enough for the application of powerful 
statistical tests, it may be possible that the non-reporting behaviour is not randomly 
distributed across respondents. In this case, we may have a selection bias and the data used in 
the above regression analysis may no longer be interpreted as a representative sample of the 
Japanese population as a whole. In Table 6, we compare the frequencies of attitudes towards 
the livelihood of the elderly with the ones in the full sample.  
 
Table 6: Japan: Answer frequencies of responsibility for livelihood of the elderly 
No. of observations  Individuals   ↔  ↔ both ↔  ↔   Government
1940 7%  11%  31%  26%  25% 
1245 7%  12%  29%  27%  25% 
 
It is apparent that the differences are minor and primarily related to the middle categories. In 
terms of the personal characteristics of the respondents listed in Table 2, most frequencies are 
in a range of plus/minus 1 percentage point compared to the representative full sample. The 
only noteworthy differences are that the smaller sample contains fewer females (4 percentage 
points), more married persons (4 percentage points), less single persons (5 percentage points), 
more with a high school background (2 percentage points), more full-time employees (3 
percentage points), and more retirees (2 percentage points). Thus, the structure of probands in 
the two samples looks rather similar.  
However, due to the scale of the missing value problem in the case of Japan and possible 
biases resulting from the constructed income variable in the case of Germany, it seems 
prudent to investigate what the outcome of the analyses will be when excluding the income 
variables.
5 When evaluating the differences between the regressions including and excluding 
indicators for income, we do not believe that the problems related with the inclusion of the 
income variable lead to severely biased estimates, as those variables that turn out to be 
relevant when excluding income are strongly correlated with income. Again, these 
conclusions are robust to the assumption of heteroscedastic errors.  
 
 
                                                 
5 The estimation results were omitted to economise on space but they are available upon request.   
 
6. Interpreting the results of the analysis 
In the next step we interpret the empirical results from the previous section in light of our 
theoretical priors. Of the nine hypotheses formulated in Section 4, only few survive the 
empirical tests in the previous section. Two hypotheses appear to receive significant statistical 
support in both Germany and Japan. As can be seen from Table 4, those persons who are 
older are more in favour of individual responsibility of providing for the elderly. In the case of 
Germany, the probability that the respondents opt in favour of private responsibility increases 
by approximately 0.14 percentage points every life-year, while the probability of being in 
favour of government responsibility decreases by about 0.1 percentage points (see Table 5). In 
the case of Japan, the latter effect is stronger, with a loss of 0.4 percentage points. This means 
that in Germany, holding all other variables at their mean values or zero, a person that is 60 
years old will be 4 percentage points more likely to opt for full individual responsibility than a 
20 year old. In Japan, the likelihood that a 60 year old person will favour full government 
responsibility will be 16 percentage points lower than of a 20 year old one. This drop in 
support for government responsibility is distributed not only to the extreme category of 
private responsibility but rather equally across the range from a mixed system to full 
individual responsibility.  
Thus, while our theoretical prior suggested a positive relation between age and government-
based system, we rather find the opposite. This somewhat puzzling result may be explained in 
a bounded rational agent framework by the level of knowledge about the actual situation of 
the pension system by the respective age groups. Younger people are more in favour of the 
government-based system because they underestimate the true costs of pension contributions 
as they pay, at least on average, lower premia. That is, they may mistakenly compare the low 
premium now with the actual pension that older people get, instead of making the calculation 
over the lifetime, which would result in a higher premium and therefore a less beneficial 
relation of contributions to actual pension payments. An additional explanation would be 
based on a variant of hyperbolic discounting, which would reduce the incentive to gather 
information about important patterns of the pension system that are of relevance in the future 
only. 
This lack of knowledge and the interest thereof may manifest themselves in the contribution 
rate by the age group. Figure 3 shows the case of Japan. The contribution rate increases with 
the group age. One would expect that younger people contribute to the government-based 
system more as they support more, but that is not the case. The only possible explanation is 
that younger people are more apathetic, thus less informed of the actual situation, and thus 
mistakenly overestimate the benefits of the government-based pension system. We would say  
 
that this is particularly true for the very young, as the retirement is still very far away. Only 
57% of those in their 20s contribute, in contrast to over 80% in the group between 55 and 59.
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Figure 3: Contribution to public pension system across age groups 
 
Source: Japanese Social Security Agency 
 
The second influence that we measure for both countries is that respondents in the two upper 
income quartiles position prefer a pension system that is oriented more towards individual 
responsibility (see Table 4). Due to the strong collinearity between income quartiles and 
absolute income we cannot be sure whether this is an absolute or a relative income effect. The 
data suggest that the relative income effect is somewhat more pronounced but these 
differences are not statistically significant. If a person in Germany moves into the highest 
income quartile then the average probability of choosing full individual responsibility for the 
livelihood of the elderly increases by about 13 percentage points, while the probabilities of 
supporting a mixed and government-based system decrease by more than 6 percentage points 
each (see Table 5)). These values are slightly lower when entering the second-highest income 
quartile, namely 11 and more than 5 percentage points each.  
In the case of Japan, these changes are more moderate. Entering the highest income quartile 
increases the likelihood of choosing a fully individual-based system by almost 4 percentage 
points, while it lowers the probability of supporting a fully government-based system by 7 
percentage points. Combining the two extreme categories of the dependent variable for 
individual- and government-based responsibility respectively, we find a drop in support for 
                                                 









the latter system by about 10 percentage points and an increase of support for a privately-
dominated system by 6 percentage points only, while the middle-category receive a 4 
percentage points higher probability. Again as in the case of Germany, joining the upper-
middle income category generates very similar effects that are quantitatively slightly smaller. 
To get an idea about the absolute money effects involved, we use the results from a regression 
based on substituting income quartiles by absolute annual income in million yen (estimation 
results omitted but available upon request). The probability of supporting a primarily 
government based pension system falls by more than 1.1 percentage point for a respondent at 
mean income who receives a raise in his annual income by one million yen (approximately 
6800 euros). At the same time, the probability of choosing a primarily private-based system 
increases by 0.7 percentage points. Correspondingly, the support for a mixed system goes up 
by 0.4 percentage points.  
 
Apart from age and income, the part-time employment status also significantly influences the 
livelihood of the elderly in both samples. However, in this case we find the direction of 
influence is substantially different across the two countries. While in Germany respondents 
that are part-time employees are significantly more in favour of government-based 
responsibility, we obtain the opposite result for Japan. The result for Germany is in line with 
our theoretical prior: people take into account that being responsible for themselves when old 
and/or for the livelihood of old-age family members depends to a large extent on their 
personal resources. In a government-based system they can expect more re-distribution to 
occur based on the principle of social equity.  
A possible explanation for the surprising result in the case of Japan may be related to the 
coverage and entrance procedure of the Japanese social insurance system. If the work time of 
part-time workers exceeds three quarters of the work time of their full-time colleagues in the 
workplaces, their social security contributions are automatically collected by deducting it 
from the salaries, just like it is done for full-time workers. However, those who work less time 
are not automatically covered by the social security system in such a way. To enter into the 
system, they would need to file in an application form and undertake the necessary steps to 
pay the premium. This procedure may be perceived as quite tedious and may constitute a 
barrier to the system for this dominant group of part-time workers. Given this situation, they 
may form an opinion that they can be better off by not entering into the system at all. 
Moreover, based on the present value of paying the insurance premia versus investing the 
money in other assets or using it to boost current consumption, e.g. due to hyperbolic 
discounting, may be utility enhancing.   
 
Regarding the effects of working part-time on the probabilities of supporting government 
responsibilities in ensuring the livelihood of the elderly, we find for Germany an increase by 
about 6 percentage points and a drop of preferences for individual-oriented responsibility by 
approximately the same amount. For Japan the likelihood of opting for full individual 
responsibility rises by more than 1 percentage points, while it drops for full government 
responsibility by 4 percentage points. Note, however, that only two of these marginal effects 
are statistically significant at a 10% level, and thus we should interpret these numbers with 
even greater caution.  
 
Finally, in addition to the factors age, income, and the part-time work status, other factors are 
identified as a source of significant influences, one for each of the two countries, the 
employment status in Japan and the political view  in Germany (see Table 4). In Japan, 
persons retiring are more likely to support a more government-based system by about 9% 
percentage points (see Table 5). They are less likely to opt for primarily private responsibility 
and a mixed system by about 5 and 4 percentage points respectively. Apparently, pensioners 
find it preferable not to depend on individual or family support in terms of provision for their 
living; once you have started your life after retirement with pension incomes, it would be very 
hard to switch to the one without it. In Germany, those  who support the PDS (Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus), a left-wing party that grew out of the Communist party of the 
former German Democratic Republic, are more in favour of government responsibility. This 
is in line with our theoretical expectations, as this party has a strong focus on the primacy of 
the government in the organisation of the state and in particular of the social security system. 
Those who vote for the PDS have a 21 percentage point higher probability of supporting a 
government based pension system, while support for an individually organised system or a 




Using the representative opinion surveys’ individual data sets, this study has examined which 
socio-demographic, economic or political characteristics explain people’s attitudes on 
whether the state or individuals should be responsible for the livelihood of the elderly in two 
aging societies, Germany and Japan. Using an ordered logit model, a few significant factors 
are identified out of several possible hypotheses. First, it is found that age and income exert 
the same influence for both countries; whereas higher income makes people more inclined 
towards the individual option, age is found to do the opposite in both countries. The former  
 
result is in line with our theoretical prior, but we find the latter counter-intuitive and 
conjecture that it is related to the level of knowledge about the current situation of the public 
pension system. We also find that part-time work status significantly affects the choice in 
both countries, but not in the same way. It surprisingly affects adversely the inclination 
towards the government option in Japan but not in Germany. We relate the Japanese result to 
its complicated contributing procedures applicable to the part-time workers. We also 
identified the pensioner status for Japan and the political position for Germany as significant 
sources of influence.  
As the paper concludes, we would like to put the present study back in the broader perspective 
of public pension reform. First, it appears to be the case that agents’ attitudes towards pension 
reform are strongly influenced by the existing system in their respective countries. This 
suggests that securing public support for pension reform must take into account the existing 
system fully. This need not imply, however, that substantial changes in a country are 
impossible, but rather that the government is more likely to garner public support if the new 
system is communicated in a way that allows people to place this new system in the context 
of the previous one.  
Second, it seems to be the case that people do not use straightforward utility maximisation 
when voicing their attitudes on pension reform. Thus, it may not be a successful strategy to 
increase public support by compensating those voters who are likely to lose from the pension 
reform, as these agents either do not understand the effects of adjusting the pension system or 
have a more socio-tropic view of economic reforms. An alternative strategy, therefore, could 
be to provide more information on the powerful forces of demographic change and the 
limitations of the existing pay-as-you-go systems under these circumstances. In this strategy, 
one ought to be open with regard to the distributional consequences of changes in the pension 
system. At the same time, policy makers should point out that a capital-based system is not 
advantageous under all circumstances and that there is no need to fully abolish the established 
pay-as-you-go system.   
Third, we encounter a typical finding in microeconomic studies, namely that the explanatory 
power of the models is limited. Thus, even allowing for the fact that the pseudo-R2 used in 
the context of ordered logit models cannot be interpreted in a straightforward way as the 
percentage of the explained variance of the dependent variable, there is little doubt that 
attitude formation is much more complex than we assume in our typical economic models. 
For our question of interest, we would interpret this as evidence that, at least so far, no clear 
consensus on pension reform has emerged among those individuals who belong to one or  
 
more particular groups of people that may face similar consequences from an evolving social 
security system.  
Some promising lines of further research that are outside the scope of the present study are the 
following. Here we only use one year of data. However, people’s attitudes change over time, 
and their opinions regarding the government role for providing the livelihood of the elderly is 
no exception. It is of interest to conduct the same analysis with (alternative) data from 
different years. We picked Germany and Japan as two examples of aging societies and found 
both similarities and differences in the comparison. Extending the analysis to other aging 
societies would help to separate general and idiosyncratic effects of personal characteristics 
on attitudes towards the organisation of the pension system and thereby could also shed 
additional light on the results obtained in the present study. Finally, should it be possible to 
collect enough observations on countries to form a cross-section or panel, we could even try 
to find out whether macroeconomic shocks affect attitudes on how to organize the pension 
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